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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction of the Court is conferred by UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)0). 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment in favor of Great American 
E&S Insurance Company ("Great American") and against Dallas W. Peters ("Peters") and 
Mary Lynn and Brandon Knuteson ("Knutesons"), including the following: 
With Respect to the Great American Policy 
A. Did the trial court commit legal error by ruling that "insured" status under 
the Great American Policy is defined by language in the Federal Policy rather than by the 
definition of "insureds" stated in the Great American Policy? 
B. Did the trial court commit legal error by incorporating by reference 
endorsement 16-02-33 of the Federal Policy into the Great American Policy contrary to 
UTAHCODE ANN. § 31A-21-106? 
With Respect to the Federal Policy 
C. Did the trial court commit legal error by ruling that Great American can 
deny coverage to Peters based upon language in the Federal Policy despite Federal's 
agreement that "Peters is an insured person under the Federal Policy" and despite payment 
of its full $ 1,000,000 policy limit? 
D. Did the trial court commit legal error by ruling that Peters was a "temporary 
employee[]" excluded by endorsement 16-02-33 of the Federal Policy despite undisputed 
1 
evidence that Peters worked full-time, five days a week, including he regularly operated 
the dump truck he was operating at the time of the accident? 
E. Did the trial court commit legal error by giving effect as a matter of "fact" 
(not law) to SOSfs claimed subjective undisclosed intent concerning the words "staff1 and 
"temporary," rather than the ordinary meaning of those words? 
F. Did the trial court commit legal error by ruling that the word "staff1 as used 
in the Federal Policy unambiguously does not refer to the individuals that "SOS Staffing" 
provides to its clients to complete the client's "staffing" needs? 
G. Did the trial court commit legal error by failing to rule that one "reasonable" 
interpretation of the Federal Policy is that Peters (an admitted employee of SOS) is an 
"insured" for purposes of automobile liability coverage? 
H. Did the trial court commit legal error by ruling that interpretation of the 
Federal Policy is to be determined based upon an alleged underwriting intention to not 
insure any SOS employee operating under the control of an SOS client when the record 
contains no evidence from Federal supporting this alleged intent and when the evidence 
from SOS is directly contrary including that SOS represented and warranted such 
coverage to clients? 
I. Did the trial court commit legal error by failing to rule that Great American 
conceded ambiguity concerning who are the "insured" employees under the Federal and 
Great America Policies in response to requests for admissions? 
2 
J. Did the trial court commit legal error by failing to rule that the word "you" 
as used in the Federal Policy is ambiguous? 
The trial court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. See Price 
Dev. Co. v. Orem City, 2000 UT 26, \ 9, 995 P.2d 1237 (Utah 2000). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
A. UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-106 (Addendum Ex. A): 
[A]n insurance policy may not contain any agreement or incorporate 
any provision not fully set forth in the policy or in an application or 
other document attached to and made a part of the policy at the time 
of its delivery. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case and Course of the Proceedings 
This is an insurance coverage dispute between Peters, an "insured" under an 
umbrella liability insurance policy, and his insurer, Great American.1 The primary 
insurer, Federal Insurance Company ("Federal") is no longer a party. Federal found 
Peters to be an "insured" and paid its full $1,000,000 limit for the benefit of Mary Lynn 
Knuteson. Ms. Knuteson is an incompetent adult represented by her husband, Brandon 
Knuteson, who suffered traumatic brain injury when Peters failed to stop at a stop sign 
while driving a dump truck. 
]Peters and Knutesons have taken the same position throughout these proceedings 
and reference to Peters1 position is that of Knutesons as well. 
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In proceedings below, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment on the 
issue of whether Peters is an "insured" under the Great American Policy. Peters1 position 
is that all "employees" of SOS Staffing, Inc. ("SOS") are "insureds" under the language of 
the Great American Policy. There is no dispute that Peters was an employee of SOS at 
the time of the accident. Peters also contends that although it is improper under UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 31A-21-106(1) to incorporate language from the Federal Policy, Federal 
correctly found Peters to be an insured under its policy language because he was not a 
"temporary" employee. Therefore, coverage exists even if terms of the Federal Policy are 
incorporated by reference. 
Great American's position is that endorsement 16-02-33 to the underlying Federal 
Policy is made a part of the Great American Policy and that this endorsement removes 
coverage for a subset of SOS's employees, specifically "temporary employees for 
customers." Great American argues that although Peters was employed full-time with an 
expectation of continued employment and Federal found him to be an "insured," Peters is 
excluded because SOS allegedly "intended" for all employees working under the 
supervision of SOS's clients to be considered "temporary" employees. 
The first issue presented on appeal is whether this case will be resolved under the 
language of the Great American Policy, the Federal Policy, or both. The trial court 
granted Great American's motion for summary judgment but did not address UTAH CODE 
ANN.§ 31 A-21-106(l) or three of the four independent grounds offered by Peters for 
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summary judgment. The trial court instead ruled based upon SOSfs alleged subjective 
"intent" concerning the Federal Policy. R 1831-35 (Addendum Ex. B). 
IL Statement of Facts 
Peters' Full-Time Employment by SOS 
1. On March 15, 2001 Peters was driving a dump truck and failed to stop at a 
stop sign, running into a vehicle driven by Mary Lynn Knuteson (hereinafter "the 
Accident"). As a result of the Accident, Mrs. Knuteson suffered traumatic brain injury 
and she requires constant care ("24/7") which she will likely need for the remainder of her 
life. Mrs. Knuteson is unable to work, cannot ambulate independently and she is unable 
to care for herself. See R 809, 962 (admitted); see also R 783-84, 797-800.2 
2. At the time of the Accident, Peters was employed by SOS Staffing, Inc. 
("SOS"). SOS became Peters1 employer as a result of Vicars Trucking Company, Inc. 
("Vicars") requesting that SOS provide payroll services for Peters and other full-time 
employees. At the time of the Accident, Peters was working full-time, five days a week. 
Mr. Peters regularly operated the dump truck he was driving at the time of the Accident. 
2Great American affirmatively admitted the SOF offered by Knutesons in support 
of summary judgment. See R 962-66 (Great American's Reply at iii-vii). Great American 
did argue that certain paragraphs were "not relevant" but Great American failed to 
provide any "citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials" to 
dispute any of the offered paragraphs and therefore the offered facts have been "deemed 
admitted" for purposes of summary judgment. See UTAH R. CIV. P. 7(c)(3)(A). 
Paragraphs 1-15 herein are taken from the SOFs offered in support of Knutesons1 motion 
for summary judgment. Paragraphs 16-36 herein are taken from Knutesons1 supplemental 
brief requested by the trial court. 
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Peters was never screened by SOS and like all of Vicars1 full-time workers, he was sent 
by Vicars to SOS (rather than being supplied by SOS from its list of screened temporary 
workers). R 809-10 flffl 2-3), 962-63 (admitted); see also R 785-86, 789-93, 794-96. 
The Federal and Great American Policies 
3. Federal Insurance Company ("Federal") wrote a contract of insurance, 
Policy No. BAT (02) 7350-75-00 (the "Federal Policy"), that provides $1,000,000 of 
liability coverage to SOS for the period from January 1, 2001 through January 1, 2002. 
R 811 (1f 5), 963 (admitted); see also R 643-95 (relevant parts Addendum Ex. C). 
4. Great American E&S Insurance Company ("Great American") wrote a 
contract of insurance, Policy No. UMG 00 41 44-04 (the "Great American Policy"), that 
provides $5,000,000 of liability coverage to SOS for the period from January 1, 2001 
through January 1, 2002 in excess of the "amounts stated as the applicable limits of the 
underlying policies listed in the Schedule of Underlying Insurance " The Federal 
Policy is listed as the "Underlying Polic[y]" for "Automobile/Garage" coverage. R 811 
fll 6), 963 (admitted); see also R 696-725 (Addendum Ex. D). 
5. An endorsement (Form CA 989) to the Federal Policy states: 
The following is added to the Section II ~ Liability Coverage, 
Paragraph A.l. Who Is An Insured Provision: Any "employee" of 
yours is an "insured" while using a covered "auto" you don't own, 
hire or borrow in your business or your personal affairs. 
R 813 ( | 17) (emphasis added), 963 (admitted); see also R 681. 
6. Another endorsement (Form 16-02-33) to the Federal Policy states: 
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FORM CA989 (02/99) "EMPLOYEES AS INSUREDS" IS 
AMENDED TO INCLUDE TO FOLLOWING WORDING: 
THIS FORM APPLIES TO THE STAFF OF THE INSURED 
ONLY AND NOT TEMPORARY EMPLOYEES FOR THE 
CUSTOMERS. 
R 813 (t 18) (emphasis added), 964 (admitted); see also R 682. 
7. The Great American Policy provides automobile coverage if "included 
under the policies listed in the Schedule of Underlying Insurance and for no broader 
coverage than is provided under such underlying policies." R 812 fl[ 11), 963 (admitted); 
see also R 704. 
8. The Great American Policy partially defines "Employees" as follows: 
Employees include "leased workers" but not "temporary workers." 
"Leased workers" are leased to you by a labor leasing firm under an 
agreement between you and the labor leasing firm to perform related 
duties to the conduct of your business. "Leased workers" are not 
"temporary workers." "Temporary workers" are persons furnished to 
you to substitute for permanent employees on leave or to meet 
seasonal or short-term workload conditions. 
R 813 (115), 963 (admitted); see also R 704. 
9. The Federal Policy partially defines "Employee" as follows: 
"Employee" includes a "leased worker." "Employee" does not 
include a "temporary worker." 
R 812 fl[ 12), 963 (admitted); see also R 662. 
10. The Federal Policy defines a "Leased worker" as follows: 
"Leased worker" means a person leased to you by a labor leasing 
firm under an agreement between you and the labor leasing firm, to 
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perform duties related to the conduct of your business. "Leased 
worker" does not include a "temporary worker." 
R 812-13 fl[ 13), 963 (admitted); see also R 662. 
11. The Federal Policy defines "Temporary worker" as follows: 
"Temporary worker" means a person who is furnished to you for a 
finite time period to support or supplement your work force in 
special work situations such as "employee" absences, temporary skill 
shortages and seasonal work loans. 
R 813 (114), 963 (admitted); see also R 663. 
12. At the time of the Accident, Peters did not fall within the definitions for 
"Temporary worker" or "temporary workers" as defined in the Policies. R 813 (Tf 16), 963 
(admitted). 
Federal's Payment of the Claim 
13. The Dump Truck driven by Peters at the time of the Accident was a 
"covered auto" under the Federal Policy. R 812 (f 10), 963 (admitted); see also R 635-
42. 
14. Federal provided full coverage of $ 1,000,000 (the amount of its policy) to 
Peters for the benefit of the Knutesons. R 818 (t 29), 965 (admitted); see also R 759-64. 
15. In providing such coverage, Federal has stated that "Peters is an insured 
person under the Federal Policy." R 818 (f 30), 966 (admitted); see also R 760-61. 
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The Great American Policy Defines Covered "Employees" And No 
Provision Of The Great American Policy Was Negotiated Or Modified 
16. The Great American Policy covers "[a]ny [SOS] employees . . . acting 
within the scope of their duties." R 1405 (f 1) (emphasis added); see also R 704. 
17. The Great American Policy is an integrated agreement and can be modified 
only by an endorsement signed by Great American. R 1405 fl[ 2); see also R 708. 
18. The Great American Policy has not been modified by subsequent 
endorsement and does not contain the language set forth in endorsement 16-02-33 to the 
Federal Policy. R 1405 fl 3); see also R 682, 696-725. 
19. Stephen G. Handley ("Handley") the insurance broker for SOS Staffing, 
Inc. ("SOS"), John K. Morrison ("Morrison") SOSfs general counsel and Mark C. 
Marshall ("Marshall") SOSfs insurance risk manager, all testified that there were no 
discussions or negotiations related to any provision of the Great American Policy and the 
language of that policy was drafted entirely by Great American. R 1405-06 (f 4); see also 
R1109, 1454, 1475-76, 1488, 1504. 
With Respect to the Federal Policy SOS And Federal Never Agreed To Use 
The Word "Temporary" To Mean "Long Term" 
20. SOS employees include so-called "payrollers." A payroller is an employee 
found by SOS's client. Payrollers can work full-time for the SOS client with the 
expectation that their employment will continue for a certain number of years or 
9 
indefinitely. The SOS client decides the length of the payrollerfs employment. R 1406 
fl[ 5); see also R 1454, 1477-78,1486, 1488, 1492-93. 
21. Dallas Peters was a full-time payroller. R 1406 (f 6); see also R 1454, 
1480, 1488, 1504. Despite the fact that payrollers can work full-time with the expectation 
of continuing employment, SOSfs witnesses claim that SOS internally lumps "payrollers11 
with other "temporaries" and calls both categories of employees "temporary employees." 
SOS claims that it internally distinguishes these employees from employees who are 
under SOS's direct supervision-so-called "staff." R 1406-07 fl[ 7); see also 1454, 1478, 
1486, 1488, 1491,1493. 
22. SOS's witnesses acknowledge that by using the words "temporary 
employee" to describe a full-time worker whose job is expected to continue, SOS uses the 
word "temporary" in a way that has no temporal meaning, contrary to the ordinary 
dictionary meaning of that word. R 1407 fl[ 8); see also 1454, 1478, 1488, 1509. 
23. No witness has any recollection of explaining to Federal SOS's unique use 
of the words "staff and "temporary employees." R 1407-08 flflf 9-11); see also, R 1109-
10, 1426, 1428-30, 1440-41, 1446, 1450, 1454-55, 1470, 1486-87, 1488-90, 1501, 1507. 
24. Although Handley was the only SOS witness who talked to Federal during 
underwriting, he does not know whether SOS intended for payrollers to be considered 
part of the covered "staff under endorsement 16-02-33. R 1408 fl[ 12); see also R 1453. 
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25. Federal wrote endorsement 16-02-33. R 1408 flj 13); see also R 1109, 
1426, 1442. 
26. After the Accident, SOS tried to convince Federal to change its position that 
Peters was a covered non-temporary "staff1 employee within the meaning of 16-02-33 
and to deny the claim. Federal's adjuster responded by telling SOS "that the wording [of 
endorsement 16-02-33 is] ambiguous." R 1408 fl[ 14); see also 1426, 1438-39, 1454, 
1480-81, 1488, 1506, 1508. 
27. At the time SOS tried to persuade Federal to change its position, SOS was 
concerned that the $1,000,000 reserve set by Federal as well as any future payment by 
Great American would impact SOS's insurance rates and/or its ability to obtain coverage. 
R 1408 fl[ 15); see also 1426, 1436, 1449, 1452, 1454,1476-77, 1488, 1504. 
SOS Has Treated Full-Time Employees As "Insureds" In Order To Meet 
Contract Requirements With its Clients 
28. SOS's clients sometimes insist that the client and the SOS employees who 
work at the direction of the client be added as "additional insureds" to SOS's automobile 
liability policy. SOS's clients also sometimes require that SOS's automobile liability 
carrier waive its right to seek subrogation against the client. R 1409 fl[ 16); see also 
R 1426, 1430, 1443, 1454, 1457, 1460, 1488, 1491. 
29. For example, SOS signed several contracts requiring that the clients and the 
employees doing work at the clients' direction be added as "additional insureds" to the 
Federal policy for automobile coverage and that Federal waive its right of subrogation 
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against the clients. R 1409 flflf 17-18); see also R 1454, 1470-71, 1473-75, 1488, 1494-
97, 1511-1643 (relevant parts Addendum Ex. E) (R 1511-68, 1584-1643). 
30. In order to meet the requirements of these contracts, SOS was required to 
either obtain an endorsement modifying the Federal Policy or locate existing language in 
the policy that provides such coverage. The Federal Policy is an integrated contract that 
can be modified only by endorsement. R 1410 (f 19); see also R 667, 1426, 1431. 
31. SOS knew Federal would not issue endorsements adding SOS's clients or 
the involved employees as "additional insureds" to the Federal Policy. R 1410 (fflf 20-21); 
see also 1426, 1431, 1436, 1451, 1454, 1456-59, 1463, 1475, 1488, 1492, 1500, 1502. 
32. SOS nevertheless issued "Certificates(s) of Liability Insurance" confirming 
"additional insured" status for automobile liability coverage including excess liability 
coverage under the Great American Policy. R 1411-12 ( | 24); see also R 1569-81, 1644-
87 (Addendum Ex. F). 
33. SOS did so in reliance on existing language in the Federal Policy to the 
effect that because the "employee" working full-time for the SOS client is an "insured," 
the SOS client is also an "insured" for vicarious liability related to the employee's 
conduct. R 1411-12 flffl 22-23); see also 1426, 1432-34, 1452, 1462, 1465, 1488, 1500, 
1503, 1510, 1697-99 (Addendum Ex. G). 
34. The certificates confirming "additional insured" status to SOS's clients 
parrot the language of an e-mail from Federal outlining policy language whereby SOS's 
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clients are additional insureds Mto the extent" they are vicariously liable for the conduct of 
the involved SOS employees. R 1413 fl[ 26); see also R 1575-80 (SOSfs clients "are 
listed as additional insureds . . . on Auto Liability policy, but only as respects work 
performed by the named insureds' employees"); 1697-99 (coverage exists for "[a]nyone 
else who is . . . liable for the conduct of an 'insured* but only to the extent of that 
liability."). 
SOS Paid a Premium for Non-Owned Auto Coverage 
35. The declarations page of the Federal Policy confirms that SOS paid a 
premium for non-owned automobile coverage based upon 10,000 employees. R 647; see. 
also R 1114 (application). 
36. SOS's general counsel confirmed that this figure is the number of 
employees working at any given time including all "payrollers." R 1492. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's ruling that Peters is not an "insured" under the Great American 
Policy must be reversed and a judgment entered finding Peters to be an insured for four 
reasons. Each of these grounds serves as an independent basis for coverage. The trial 
court addressed only the second ground and failed to consider that each ground separately 
supports a finding of coverage. 
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1. Peters is an Insured Under the Great American Policy Language. 
First, the Great American Policy defines all SOS's "employees" as insureds and 
Peters is admittedly an SOS employee. Great American's argument that endorsement 16-
02-33 of the Federal Policy redefines the covered employees to exclude "temporary 
employees for the customers" fails as a matter of contract interpretation and under the 
Utah Insurance Code's prohibition against incorporation by reference. With respect to the 
contract, Great American concedes the requirement that automobile coverage be 
"included" in the Federal Policy is not an incorporation of specific language, but merely a 
pre-condition to coverage that has been met. See R 1855 at 5-6, 8. Further, the "for no 
broader coverage than is provided" language, at most, references the scope of the 
underlying automobile insuring clause, not the list of "insureds" separately defined in 
each policy. Cases uniformly hold that a reference to underlying "coverage" is to the type 
of risk covered, not specific limiting language. 
In all events, Great American's argument is one of incorporation by reference 
prohibited by UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-106(1). Great American's only response is that 
if this statute applies, no automobile coverage is provided at all. However, the pre-
condition that automobile coverage be provided by underlying insurance has been met. 
Further, this Court has uniformly held that insurance policies will be enforced without 
limiting language that is improperly incorporated. See Cullum v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 857 
P.2d 922, 927 (Utah 1993); Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 
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925 P.2d 1270, 1275 (Utah 1996); and Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call, 712 P.2d231, 236-37 
(Utah 1985). Any other outcome rewards Great American for issuing a non-complying 
policy. 
2. Peters is an Insured Under the Federal Policy Language. 
Second, if this Court evaluates endorsement 16-02-33 of the Federal Policy, 
coverage must be provided because it is clear Federal correctly interpreted that language 
by finding Peters to be an "insured" and by paying its $1,000,000 limit. Great American's 
argument is that Peters must be considered a "temporary" employee of SOS even though 
it is undisputed that he was working full-time with an expectation of continuing 
permanent employment. Great American has attempted to turn the word "temporary" into 
its antonym, "permanent." However, a "temporary" worker is defined in dictionaries and 
in the policies as someone retained for a short period of time. Great American also gives 
the word "stafff an unwarranted meaning of not working "under the direction and control 
of customers." Dictionaries and other relevant sources define an organization's "staff1 as 
its "employees." SOS itself uses the word "staff1 to refer to the workers it employs to be 
supervised by clients. At best, the word "staff1 is "flexible, elastic, slippery and 
somewhat ambiguous" and therefore it cannot serve to eliminate coverage. Gov't Empl 
Ins. Co. v. Dennis, 645 P.2d 672, 674 (Utah 1982). 
In trying to overcome straightforward definitions and common meaning, Great 
American argued to the trial court that "[t]his case is about whether SOS intended that its 
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employees driving customers1 vehicles while doing customers1 work be insureds under 
SOS auto liability policies." In essence, Great American persuaded the trial court that 
SOS subjectively intended for black ("temporary") to mean white ("permanent") or black 
("temporary"). However, before the word "temporary" can be given the meaning of its 
antonym-"perrnanent"-Great American had to first show the word is ambiguous. The 
trial court found no such ambiguity (R 1831-34) and unambiguous terms are interpreted 
according to plain and ordinary meaning. Dawson v. Dawson, 841 P.2d 749, 750 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992). Moreover, SOSfs post-claim assertions of alleged intent are entirely 
irrelevant since "[a] party's subjective, undisclosed intent is immaterial to the 
interpretation of a contract, [and] the court will give force and effect to the words of the 
contract without regard to what the parties to the contract thought it meant or what they 
intended for it to mean." 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 347. There is no evidence that SOS 
and Federal agreed to use the words "temporary" or "staff* in a unique way. 
Therefore, this Court can read the words used and give them a common meaning. 
If the Court looks beyond the words, the only potentially admissible evidence relates to 
performance and such evidence uniformly supports coverage. Specifically, SOS was 
required to confirm automobile coverage for its clients and for the involved employees. 
SOS did so based upon Federal's written assurance that such coverage was provided. 
Great American persuaded the trial court to ignore this undisputed evidence with an 
apology that SOS "like all businesses . . . were under pressure to do certain things. 
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Nobody wanted to issue those certificates [showing insured status for customers and the 
involved employees]." This apology is irrelevant. Most importantly, key performance 
evidence comes directly from Federal. Federal drafted endorsement 16-02-33 and it has 
paid the claim precisely because Peters is an "insured." 
3. Alternatively, the Federal Policy Language is Ambiguous. 
Third, coverage for Peters should be recognized even if Great American has 
advanced a "reasonable" interpretation of 16-02-33 because the interpretation offered by 
Federal and Peters is clearly reasonable. It is settled that if language is subject to more 
than one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous and "any ambiguity or uncertainty in 
the language of and insurance policy must be resolved in favor of coverage." LDSHosp. 
v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988). The interpretation offered by 
Peters and Federal is reasonable since the words used ("temporary" and "staff) have been 
given a common meaning, and the offered reading is consistent with the parties1 
performance, including Federal's payment of the claim and SOS's representations to 
clients. 
4. Coverage Has Been Provided Under the Federal Policy and Great 
American Must Follow. 
Fourth, coverage for Peters should be recognized because the Great American 
Policy offers coverage when insurance is "provided under" the Federal Policy. Since 
coverage has in fact been "provided under" the Federal Policy, Great American must 
follow Federal's lead under established law. 
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ARGUMENT 
Because entitlement to summary judgment is a question of law, this Court accords 
no deference to the trial court's resolution. Peterson v. The Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, 
113, 48 P.3d 918. Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issues of material 
fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. In 
reviewing summary judgment, this Court views "the facts and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Id. 
Applying these standards, this Court must reverse and enter a judgment in favor of 
Peters and Knutesons for four independent reasons. The trial court failed to address 
three of these grounds, including the mandate in UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-106(1) that 
all provisions of an insurance policy be stated in the policy and not incorporated by 
reference. See R 1831-35. As detailed below, it does not matter whether this Court 
disallows incorporation by reference or looks to the Federal Policy. In either case, Peters 
is an "insured." Peters will first address the language of the Great American Policy and 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-106(1). Peters will then address the three independent 
reasons why Federal was correct in concluding that Peters is an "insured." 
I. THE GREAT AMERICAN POLICY COVERS ALL SOS'S EMPLOYEES. 
Great American agrees that before a provision of a primary policy will be read into 
an umbrella policy "there would, at the least, [have] had to be a conspicuous, clear and 
express clause that incorporated the exclusions of the primary policy into the [excess 
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coverage section of the] umbrella policy." R 980-81 (quoting Megonnell v. United 
Services Ass'n, 796 A.2d 758, 773 (Md. 2002)). Great American further concedes 
n[n]owhere in Great American's policy are the words ffollow form1 found, let alone a 
'conspicuous, clear and express clause' incorporating the provisions of the primary auto 
policy into the umbrella policy." R 981. Consequently, the Great American policy must 
stand on its own and, as an "umbrella" policy, its terms may be broader than the 
underlying insurance.3 
Unlike the Federal Policy, the Great American Policy contains no endorsement 
purporting to limit the covered SOS employees. Instead, the Great American Policy 
provides insurance for any SOS employee with the only limitation being that they act 
"within the scope of their duties." See R 704, | F.6. The relevant language reads: 
F. "Insured" means each of the following to the extent set forth: 
*See Capitol Reprod., Inc. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 800 F.2d 617, 623-24 (6th Cir. 
1986) (an umbrella "performs a further service of providing a broader range and a greater 
dollar-value of coverage in excess of the coverage afforded by the primary insurer [but] 
the costs of the excess insurance can be minimized [because] the premium is determined 
based upon the amount of the [primary] limits [and] also [is] influenced by the knowledge 
that most losses can be adjusted satisfactorily within the limits of the primary insurance 
policies."); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Walbrooklns. Co., Ltd., 7 F.3d 1047, 1053 (1st 
Cir. 1993) ("the broader function served by umbrella policies [is to] extend [] coverage 
even to unanticipated 'gaps'") (cited by Great American); Fid. & Deposit Co. of Maryland 
v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 189 F. Supp.2d 1212, 1223 (D. Kan. 2002) ("an umbrella policy 
can provide broader coverage than the underlying policy, meaning that the umbrella 
policy will 'drop down' to provide primary coverage. Put another way, [a]n umbrella 
policy has been characterized as a 'hybrid policy, combining aspects of both a primary and 
a following form excess policy.'"). 
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6. Any of your partners executive officers, directors or 
employees but only while acting within the scope of their 
duties. 
However, the coverage granted by this Provision 6, does not 
apply to the ownership, maintenance, use, "loading" or 
"unloading" of any "autos" . . . unless such coverage is 
included under the policies listed in the Schedule of 
Underlying Insurance and for no broader coverage than is 
provided under such underlying policies. 
Employees include ffIeased workers" but not "temporary 
workers." "Leased workers" are leased to you by a labor 
leasing firm under an agreement between you and the 
labor leasing firm to perform related duties to the conduct 
of your business. "Leased workers" are not "temporary 
workers." "Temporary workers" are persons furnished 
to you to substitute for permanent employees on leave or 
to meet seasonal or short-term workload conditions. 
R 704, Section V, Definitions, f F.6 (Exhibit F) (emphasis added). 
Despite the above express definition of who the covered employees "include," 
Great American argues that the "no broader coverage" language serves to incorporate 
endorsement 16-02-33 of the Federal Policy thereby redefining the list of "insureds" to a 
subset of SOSfs employees. R 1855 at 74. In doing so, Great American reads out of the 
policy an entire clause (68 words) defining which SOS "employees" are included, in favor 
of language not found in the policy. Obviously, if Great American intended for language 
to be included in the Great American Policy, "it certainly could have included such a 
provision in the umbrella policy." See Capitol Reprod., 800 F.2d at 623. 
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Moreover, Great American's incorporation of endorsement 16-02-33 is contrary to 
the Utah Insurance Code. No insurance policy in Utah can "incorporate any provision not 
fully set forth in the policy or in an application or other document attached to and made a 
part of the policy at the time of delivery, unless the policy, application, or agreement 
accurately reflects the terms of the incorporated agreement, provision or attached 
document.1' UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-106(1 )(a). Here the Great American Policy 
neither attaches nor incorporates by reference the terms of endorsement 16-02-33 as Great 
American concedes. See R 981 ("[njowhere [is there] a 'conspicuous, clear and express 
clause' incorporating the provisions of the primary auto policy into the umbrella policy."). 
This Court has enforced the provisions of § 31A-21-106(l)(a) without exception. 
For example, in Cullum, 857 P.2d at 925 the policy granted coverage for permissive users 
of an automobile and stated that the amount of such insurance would be the minimum 
under the applicable "Financial Responsibility Law." This Court held that the failure to 
state the actual amount of the statutory minimum precluded the minimum from being 
applied because the purpose of § 31A-21-106(l)(a) is "to ensure that the entire insurance 
contract is contained in one document so that the insured can determine from the policy 
exactly what coverage he or she has." Id.4 
4Another analogous case is Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto Ins., 925 P.2d 1270 (Utah 1996). In Universal the policy did not define all of the 
insureds, other than to state that the policy covered the first named insured and "any other 
person or organization required by law to be an INSURED." This Court held that a 
policyholder could not determine who was precisely insured by reviewing the policy and 
(continued...) 
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Great American tries to overcome the clear prohibition against incorporation by 
arguing that unless terms of the Federal Policy become part of the Great American Policy, 
no automobile coverage exists at all because the Great American Policy states automobile 
coverage is not provided "unless such coverage is included under the policies listed . . . 
and for no broader coverage than is provided under such underlying policies.n See R 704; 
R 1855 at 6-7, 69 and 74. Great American's argument fails for several reasons. 
First, Great American concedes that the requirement that automobile coverage be 
"included" in the underlying policy is not an incorporation of specific language but 
merely a pre-condition to coverage. R 1855 at 8 ("No it does not incorporate by 
reference. It required you to look at the underlying policies...."). As such, a court can 
look to the Federal Policy for the limited purpose of determining whether automobile 
coverage exists (i.e., is this type of risk insured against) without incorporating by 
reference specific policy language, in particular limiting language. Great American 
concedes that this condition has been met because "there is an underlying policy 
providing auto coverage." R 1855 at 5-6 (Great American's counsel). Recognizing 
satisfaction of this condition does no violence to § 31 A-21-106(l)(a) because no specific 
terms, and particularly no limitations, are incorporated. 
4(...continued) 
therefore § 31A-21-106(1 )(a) was violated and the statutory minimums for permissive 
users could not be incorporated by reference. 
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Great American nevertheless argues that the reference to "for no broader 
coverage" imposes more than a condition. Great American argues this language results in 
the specific limitations of endorsement 16-02-33 becoming a part of the Great American 
Policy. See R 1855 at 8 ("you [must] look at the underlying policies to determine who is 
an insured under the underlying policy"); id. at 28 (same). However, many cases 
(including those cited by Great American) make clear that a reference to "coverage" in an 
umbrella policy is to the type of risk covered by the primary policy, not a specific 
definition of the "insureds," or any other limiting language.5 An instructive case is King 
5For example, in Megonnell (relied upon by Great American at R 980-81) a wife 
obtained a verdict against her husband. The husband's primary insurer was not liable for 
the judgment in excess of a statutory minimum because the primary policy contained a so-
called "household" exclusion. The husband's umbrella policy did not contain such an 
exclusion but did state: "We provide excess liability protection for occurrences covered 
by primary insurance." 796 A.2d at 764. The umbrella carrier argued, as Great American 
does here, that the reference to the primary's "coverage" served to incorporate by 
reference specific exclusionary language of the primary policy. The Court disagreed, 
holding that incorporation must be "conspicuous, clear and express." Id, at 773. The 
Court read the umbrella to require only that the primary policy cover the type of risk 
identified-an automobile accident-that meets the definition of an "occurrence" under the 
primary policy. Id. at 772. 
Similarly, in Walbrook (another case relied upon by Great American at R 981), an 
umbrella policy stated: "this policy is extended to include Engineers Professional 
Liability [EPL] as more fully described in the underlying General liability policy/ies." Id. 
at 1052. The umbrella carrier argued that this language served to limit the EPL coverage 
to "claims made" rather than "occurrence" coverage since "claims made" was the only 
type of coverage "described in the underlying" policy. Id. The Court disagreed based 
upon the purpose of umbrella policies (to fill gaps) and the actual language of the 
umbrella policy read as a whole. The Court held that this type of risk-EPL-was 
"covered" by the primary and that incorporation of the "claims made" language from the 
(continued...) 
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v. Employers Nat'l Ins. Co., 928 F.2d 1438 (5th Cir. 1991). In King, as here, the umbrella 
carrier tried to equate a reference to "coverage11 to the specific list of "insureds11 defined in 
the underlying policy. The excess carrier argued that language requiring prior notice of 
"any change in coverage of the underlying insurance" applies to the adding of "additional 
insureds" to the policy. The Fifth Circuit disagreed: 
The policy also states that it shall only apply to certain "coverages" 
which are set out in the declarations page of the policy... . In the 
declarations page, "coverage" includes general risks such as bodily 
injury and property damage for which Interstate provides indemnity. 
. . . Thus the word "coverage" as used in this policy refers to the 
nature of the risks insured against and not to the parties insured. 
Id. at 1445 (emphasis added).6 
5(... continued) 
primary into the umbrella would render the umbrella's actual language "meaningless." 
Id.; see also Reyes-Lopez v. Misener Marine Constr. Co., 854 F.2d 529, 530 n.2 (1st Cir. 
1988) ('"Coverage1 refers to whether losses arising from a particular risk (an activity or 
event) are within the scope of the insurance"); Bernard Lumber Co. v. Louisiana Ins. 
Guaranty Ass% 563 S.2d 261, 266 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (the word "coverage" as used in 
an umbrella policy "refers to being insured against a specified risk or loss" under the 
primary policy and therefore the absence of an ability to collect against the primary carrier 
is not a requirement of "coverage"); Wells Fargo Bank v. California Guar. Ass'n., 45 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 537, 545 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) ("a layperson would have understood the phrases 
'covered by said underlying insurance' and 'not covered by said underlying insurance' as 
referring to the scope of the underlying insurance" not whether payment is actually made) 
(emphasis in original); Carlson v. Doekson Gross Inc., 372 N.W.2d 902, 906 (N.D. 1985) 
("limitation on coverage should be accomplished by specific exclusions or endorsements 
to the policy, not by a limiting designation of the named insured."). 
6Although the Court in King found that the same insureds were covered by both 
policies, it did so because the excess policy was a true "following form" policy that 
expressly incorporated all "provisions of the immediate underlying policy" and the excess 
policy did not contain its own definition of "insureds." Id. at 1444. 
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As in King, there is no way to equate Great American's reference to "coverage" to 
the specific list of "insureds" separately defined in the two policies. At most, the "no 
broader coverage" language refers to the scope of the insuring provision for automobiles, 
not the list of "insureds." The Federal Policy insures against '"bodily injury* or 'property 
damage'... caused by an 'accident.'" R 655. There is no question that this insuring 
language is triggered by the tragic injuries suffered by Mary Lynn Knuteson.7 
In addition, if Great American's reading of the "no broader coverage" language 
were correct as a matter of contract interpretation, its interpretation nevertheless runs 
squarely into UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-106(l)(a). The Utah Insurance Commissioner 
has specifically advised that "[n] either should definitions of terms be incorporated by 
reference." See Bulletin 94-1 (Revised 10/96) (discussing UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-
106(1)). In Universal Underwriters, this Court held that a policy violated § 31A-21-
7The insuring language of the Great American umbrella policy is even broader, 
since it covers all "sums . . . the 'Insured' becomes legally obligated to pay by reason of 
liability imposed by law.M R 700. The fact that the "no broader coverage" language at 
most refers to the scope of the insuring language for automobiles, not the list of 
"insureds," is reinforced by exclusion O. That exclusion states there is no coverage for 
"liability arising out of. . . any 'auto' except to the extent that such insurance is provided 
by a policy listed in the Schedule of Underlying Insurance, and for no broader coverage 
than is provided by such policy." R 703. In context, it is clear that this is a reference to 
the "risk" insured against, specifically automobile accidents, not the list of "insureds." 
Even if the for "no broader coverage" language could be read to refer to the list of 
"insureds," Great American's interpretation is nonetheless not the only "reasonable" 
interpretation. For the reasons described below (infra Sections II.A and IV), coverage 
must still be found based upon an ambiguity, especially because there were no discussions 
or negotiations related to any provision of the Great American Policy. See SOF 1 19. 
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106(1) because it could not be "determine[d], simply by reading [the policy], who was 
insured under the policies.M 925 P.2d at 1274-75. Thus, it is clear that a definition of 
"insureds" cannot be incorporated by reference. 
The issue then becomes whether Great American will be rewarded for issuing a 
non-complying policy in a situation where Great American concedes the pre-condition to 
coverage (underlying automobile coverage) has been met. See R 756; R 1855 at 5-6. The 
clear answer is that the Utah Insurance Code prohibits Great American from using the no 
incorporation statute as a shield. Under this Court's prior decisions, a policy will be 
enforced without limiting language sought to be incorporated. In Cullum, for example, 
the remedy for defining policy limits by incorporation was not to render the policy 
without coverage, but to provide coverage without such limitation. 857 P.2d at 927. 
Similarly, in Universal Underwriters, this Court held that the result of the failure to 
define permissive users was not to eliminate coverage or to limit coverage to permissive 
drivers listed in a statute, but to insure all permissive drivers as "insureds." 925 P.2d at 
1275. In Call, 712 P.2d at 236-37, this Court similarly stated that "especially 
exclusionary language" will not be incorporated by reference and a policy must be 
enforced without the "invalid" limiting language.8 
8The Insurance Code requires this result. While incorporation by reference is 
prohibited (UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-106(l)(c)), the next provision of the Code 
addresses "[c]ontract rights under noncomplying policies" and states a "policy is 
enforceable against the insurer according to its terms, even if it exceeds the authority of 
(continued...) 
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In this case, the Great American Policy must be enforced because it fully defines 
the covered "insureds.ff See R 704. This language can be enforced without resort to 
incorporation by reference as argued for by Great American under a different name. See 
R 1855 at 29; see also id. at 8-9 (same). Under the Great American Policy, the list of 
covered "employees" is all SOS employees, including Peters. 
II. COVERAGE EXISTS IF THE GREAT AMERICAN POLICY IS 'FOLLOW 
FORM" AND THE LANGUAGE OF ENDORSEMENT 16-02-33 IS 
INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE. 
As set forth above, incorporation by reference is improper and this Court may 
never reach the language of endorsement 16-02-33 to the Federal Policy. Nevertheless, if 
this Court decides to evaluate 16-02-33, it is clear that Federal correctly interpreted this 
language, finding Peters to be an "insured" for three independent reasons. First, as set 
forth in Section III below, Peters is not an excluded "temporary" employee. Second, as 
set forth in Section IV below, even if Great American's reading of endorsement 16-02-33 
is one "reasonable" interpretation, the endorsement is ambiguous and therefore coverage 
must be provided. Third, as set forth in Section V, Great American agreed to follow 
Federal's provision of coverage. 
The rules of construction that apply to each of these distinct issues are described in 
subpart A below. 
8(...continued) 
the insurer." UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-107(1) (emphasis added). 
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A. Rules of Construction. 
In evaluating the Federal Policy, this Court must consider several critical rules of 
contact interpretation, including the particular rules applied to insurance contracts. This 
Court should also note how the relevant burdens are allocated between Great American 
and Peters for purposes of applying these rules. 
First, insurance contracts are "construed liberally in favor of the insured and their 
beneficiaries so as to promote and not defeat the purposes of insurance." Farmers Ins, 
Exch. v. Versaw, 2004 UT 73, f 24, 99 P.3d 796 (quoting United States Fid. & Guar. Co. 
v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 521 (Utah 1953). Consequently, ff[i]t should also be kept in mind 
that 'the purpose of insurance is to insure,1 and clauses excluding activities from coverage 
are to be strictly construed against the insurer." Dawson, 841 P.2d at 750. Anything that 
"is not clearly excluded from the operation of [an insurance] contract is included in the 
operation thereof." LDSHosp., 765 P.2d at 859. Language which purports to cut back 
coverage (even if not designated as an "exclusion") will be "strictly construed" and only 
"explicit language" will serve to limit coverage. See Sandt, 854 P.2d at 524. 
Second, if the language functions as a limitation, exception or condition to 
coverage, then it "must be made and established by the insurer to escape liability 
thereunder." LDSHosp., 765 P.2dat 859. 
Third, when an insurance company "uses a 'slippery1 word to mark out and 
designate those who are insured by the policy, it is not the function of the court to 
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sprinkle sand upon the ice by strict construction of the term. All who may, by any 
reasonable construction of the word, be included within the coverage afforded by 
the policy should be given its protection. If, in the application of this principle of 
construction . . . the company falls into a coverage somewhat more extensive than it 
contemplated, the fault lies in its own selection of the words [used]." Dennis, 645 P.2d at 
675 (emphasis added). 
Fourth, the words in an insurance contract, "even more than in the construction of 
statutes, words . . . should be given the meaning which they have for laymen in such daily 
usage, rather than a restrictive meaning." Id. 
Fifth, "the parties1 actions and performance [are] evidence of the parties' true 
intention." WebBank v. American General Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, f 19, 54 
P.3d 1139, 1145. 
Sixth, if the language in an insurance contract has two or more reasonable 
interpretations, i.e. is ambiguous, then such "provisions are usually construed against the 
insurer without resort to extrinsic evidence, because insurance contracts are ordinarily 
standard forms, whose language is not negotiated by the parties." Home Savings and 
Loan v. Aetna Cas. andSur. Co., 817 P.2d 341, 347 (Utah 1991); see also Versaw, 2004 
UT 73 at f 25 ("uncertain language in an insurance contract that is fairly susceptible to 
different interpretations should be construed in favor of coverage."). 
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III. PETERS IS AN SOS EMPLOYEE WHO IS NOT A "TEMPORARY 
EMPLOYEE FOR [SOS] CUSTOMERS." 
Applying the above principles, Peters is an "insured" under the Federal Policy. 
The Federal Policy states in endorsement CA 989 that "Any 'employee1 of yours is an 
'insured' while using a covered auto you don't own, hire or borrow in your business or 
your personal affairs." See SOF % 5. Great American concedes that Peters was an 
"employee" of SOS driving a covered vehicle (i.e., any vehicle) at the time of the 
Accident. See SOF ^  2? 
Despite this straightforward coverage analysis, on April 22, 2003 (R 755-58) Great 
American denied the claim. Great American did so by making an incorrect factual claim 
that Peters was "one of many" temporary workers "assigned by SOS to its customers for 
specific jobs or temporary assignments." See R 757 (emphasis added). In making this 
9See also R 635-36 ("Dallas Peters, an employee of your insured SOS . . . was 
operating a dump truck. . . . We believe that Mr. Peters was an employee using a covered 
auto."); R 637-38 ("Mr. Peters was an employee at the time of loss . . . . We believe that 
Mr. Peters was an employee using a covered auto, because the policy provides coverage 
for 'any auto.'"); R 642 ("There is no question that Peters was an employee of SOS and 
was using a vehicle that was neither owned, hired or borrowed at the time of the 
accident."). At the time of these admissions, Great American nevertheless questioned 
whether Peters acted "in [SOS's] business." Great American abandoned this argument 
before sending its denial letter because it is clear Peters furthered the interests of SOS and 
he was undeniably SOS's "employee." SOS's witnesses have confirmed that leasing 
employees like Peters furthers SOS's business. Morrison Depo at 148 (R 1508); see also 
Marshall Depo at 180 (R 1485) ("our business is placing people on assignment."). The 
Tenth Circuit has rejected the argument that a leased employee does not act in the 
business of the leasing employer. See Air Liquide Am. Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 217 
F.3d 1272, 1277-78 (10th Cir. 2000). 
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factual claim, Great American acknowledged that Peters was "an employee of SOS" and 
that its only avenue to a denial was to argue that under endorsement 16-02-33 Peters was 
not an insured because he was a "TEMPORARY EMPLOYEE FOR THE 
CUSTOMERS." R 756-57. In the words of the denial letter, Peters was "one of many" 
SOS temporaries who worked on "temporary assignments" and on March 15, 2001 Peters 
was supposedly "performing temporary work for Vicars Trucking." Id. 
However, Great American knew better. Great American had received discovery in 
the underlying action showing that Peters was never a temporary employee for SOS 
assigned to temporary assignments. SOF f 2.10 Great American has subsequently 
conceded these facts, including that Peters was an existing full-time employee for whom 
SOS became his legal employer. SOF at 12. In short, the one and only basis for Great 
American's original denial is directly contrary to admitted facts. 
As a result, Great American's lawyers constructed a new basis for denial-one that 
is nowhere stated in the denial letter and one that has nothing to do with policy language. 
10SOS has distinct businesses of employee leasing (similar to many other PEOfs) 
and its more well known role as a supplier of "temps." See R 1112 (application). Given 
these distinct businesses, Great American was asked to "[a]dmit that Dallas W. Peters was 
never on SOS's list of temporary associates" and that he was "working full-time in his 
employment at the time of the accident." See Great American's Admissions, Request 
Nos. 5 and 11 (R 630-32). Great American responded by stating "[t]he information 
presently known or readily obtained by Great American is insufficient to enable it to 
admit or deny this Request." Id. In other words, Great American admits that at the time 
of its coverage denial it did not have factual support for the claim that Peters acted as one 
of SOS's temporary workers assigned temporarily to clients. 
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Great American evolved its arguments to the bold claim that "[t]his case is about whether 
SOS intended that its employees driving customers' vehicles while doing those 
customers1 work be insureds under SOSfs auto liability policies." R 1710. This argument 
is legally irrelevant and factually wrong for the reasons detailed below. As Great 
American's first coverage counsel concluded, once Peters is shown to have acted "in your 
[SOS's] business," Peters "is clearly insured under the [Federal] policy." See R 635-38. 
A. Great American's Interpretation of "Temporary" and "Staffy is 
Contrary to Ordinary Usage and Unreasonable. 
Great American's position is that Peters must be considered a "temporary" 
employee of SOS regardless of the full-time nature and permanency of his employment. 
However, in Utah, all limitations to coverage are strictly construed and Great American 
bears the burden of proving that a limitation applies. See LDSHosp., 765 P.2d at 859. 
By claiming that Peters is a "temporary" employee, regardless of whether his 
position is full-time or permanent, Great American has turned the word temporary into 
its antonym. According to Great American, it "is not important... how long 
[employees] will [work]." R 974 (emphasis added). However, the word "temporary" is 
defined as follows: 
1. Lasting or effective for a time only; not permanent. 2. an 
office worker hired, usu. through an agency on a per diem basis, for 
a short period of time. 
RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY (2d ed. Revised 2000) (emphasis 
added) R 1073-75 (Addendum Ex. H). 
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This common sense definition of "temporary" is used in both policies to define 
"temporary workers." See Federal Policy (R 663), Section V, Definitions, f N 
("Temporary workerf means a person who is furnished to you for a finite time period . . . 
in special work situations such as employee absences, temporary skill shortages and 
seasonal workloads."); Great American Policy (R 704), Section V, Definitions, f^ F 
("Temporary workers1 are persons furnished to you to substitute for permanent employees 
on leave or to meet seasonal or short-term workload conditions."). The Policies also 
expressly state that the temporal nature of employment makes a difference for coverage 
purposes because "temporary workers" are not insureds but full-time employees, 
including "leased" workers, are insureds. See SOF ffif 8 and 11. 
The key endorsements (CA 989 and 16-02-33) draw this same distinction-
temporary workers assigned to customers are not covered but all other full-time 
employees are "insureds." SOF at ff 5-6. The policy must be read as a whole and the 
endorsements harmonized with these main policy definitions. St Paul Fire & Marine Ins, 
v. Commercial Union Assurance, 606 P.2d 1206, 1208 (Utah 1980) ("As a general rule: 
endorsements . . . are to be read and construed with the policy proper") {quoting 1 Couch 
on Insurance 2d, Sec. 15:30). 
In trying to overcome these straightforward definitions and common meaning, 
Great American argues in essence that SOS subjectively intended for black ("temporary") 
to mean white ("permanent") or black ("temporary"). However, before Great American 
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can give the word "temporary" the meaning of its antonym-"permanent"-Great American 
must first show that the word "temporary" is ambiguous. See Dawson, 841 P.2d at 750 
("If the policy terms . . . are unambiguous, then 'we interpret those terms in accordance 
with their plain and ordinary meaning1") (quoting Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. U.S. Life 
Title Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 933, 936 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)); see also 17A Am.Jur.2d 
Contracts § 348 ("the intention of the parties must be gathered from that language, and 
that language alone, no matter what the actual or secret intentions of the parties may have 
been"). Great American fails to cite a dictionary or other source to justify its position that 
"temporary" can mean "permanent." 
Instead, Great American argues that this Court cannot interpret the words black 
("temporary") or white ("permanent") because supposedly all "knowledge of [SOS's] 
employment and personnel practices" resides with SOS. See R 962, 975-76. It is a 
Court's job, however, to read and interpret the Federal Policy and to give the policy a 
plain meaning. Home Savings, 817 P.2d at 347 ("[t]he interpretation of a contract 
normally presents a question of law"). The law is settled that "[a] party's subjective, 
undisclosed intent is immaterial to the interpretation of a contract, [and] the court will 
give force and effect to the words of the contract without regard to what the parties to the 
contract thought it meant or what they intended for it to mean." 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts 
§ 347. Courts simply are not in the business of "attempt[ing] to ascertain the actual 
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mental processes of the parties in entering into a contract; rather the law presumes that the 
parties understood the import of their contract." Id. 
While most parties are not so bold as to argue that a word should be read as its 
antonym, the argument that a word should be given an undisclosed subjective meaning 
attributed to it by the policyholder is hardly new. Great American, as a sophisticated 
insurer, is aware of and has advocated in favor of the overwhelming body of law rejecting 
subjective interpretation. See Nichols v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 169 Cal. App.3d 766, 215 
Cal. Rptr. 416, 421 (1985) ("words in an insurance policy are to be read in their plain and 
ordinary sense"). 
This Court has likewise rejected subjective interpretation of insurance policies. In 
Utah, words must be interpreted as "used in common, daily, non-technical speech," not 
based on specialized industry vocabulary. See Dennis, 645 P.2d at 675; Dawson, 841 
P.2d at 751 (contract interpreted "in accordance with the usual and natural meaning of the 
words."); Valley Bank, 776 P.2d at 936 (policy terms are given "plain meaning"). The test 
is objective and looks at the language "as an ordinary purchaser of insurance would 
understand it." Sandt, 854 P.2d at 523; Draughon v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc., Ill P.2d 
1105, 1108 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (same). 
Stripping the words "temporary employees" of specialized or technical meaning, 
the phrase clearly does not describe the opposite-full-time permanent employees. Under 
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straightforward contract interpretation, Peters is covered because he was not a 
"temporary" worker. 
Great American's reading of the word "staff is equally uncompelling. As an 
initial matter, it is important to note that the word "STAFF" is not separately defined in 
the Federal Policy outside of its use in endorsement 16-02-33. See Great American 
Admissions, No. 14 (R 632). Under the language of that endorsement, the potential 
"cutback" in coverage is for those employees who are "TEMPORARY EMPLOYEES 
FOR THE CUSTOMERS." See R 682. In other words, the Federal Policy defines 
"STAFF" in the very provision Great American cites. The allegedly "excluded" non-
"STAFF" are the "TEMPORARY EMPLOYEES FOR THE CUSTOMERS." 
Nevertheless, Great American argues the excluded non-"staff' does not refer to 
just "temporary employees" as stated, but instead to any employee who is not working 
"under the direction and control of customers" whether permanent or temporary. R 974. 
Great American never attempts to explain how this extraordinary limitation can be 
gleaned from the word "STAFF." At best, the word is multidimensional. See Dennis, 
645 P.2d at 674. In Dennis, this Court observed that the word "resident" (similar to the 
word "staff1) has "different shades of meaning" and while frequently used, it "has no 
precise, technical, and fixed definition applicable to all contexts and to all cases" and 
therefore the word is "flexible, elastic, slippery and somewhat ambiguous." Id. at 674. 
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As recognized in a common thesaurus, "staff" and "employee" can be used as 
synonyms. See Roget's Thesaurus, p. 581 (3rd ed. 1998) (R 941-42) (stating that the 
synonyms for "staff1 include "crew, personnel, help, employees"); id. at 191 (stating that 
one synonym for "employee" is "staff member") (Addendum Ex. I.). SOS itself uses the 
word "staff1 to refer to the people it sends to clients to be supervised by those clients. See 
R 1081-84 (SOSfs website) (Addendum Ex. J).11 
Consequently, it is clear that Peters, as an admitted SOS employee, "may by 
reasonable construction of the word"-STAFF-be included within the coverage afforded 
by the policy. Dennis, 645 P.2d at 675.12 
11
 SOS refers to the services it provides to its customers through its employees as 
"staffing." See R 1081-84. Obviously, the people who provide this "staffing service" can 
reasonably be considered SOS's "staff." For example, SOS discloses on its website that it 
changed its name from "SOS Temporary Services to SOS Staffing Services, Inc. -a 
name that would better reflect [SOS]fs changing scope and broader range of services." 
R 1084. A part of this change is the suppling of "permanent" employees, not just 
"temporaries." See R 1082 ("SOS Staffing services . . . provides temporary, temp-to-hire 
and permanent placements"); see also R 1081 (SOS meets the needs of "employer[s] 
looking for staffing solutions"); R 1083 ("We are dedicated to providing quality staffing 
services"). 
12It is worth noting that while Great American criticized the Knutesons for citing a 
thesaurus rather than a dictionary in looking at the common meaning of the word "staff," 
the dictionary definition for "staff1 is essentially the same as the cited thesaurus: 
1. a group of people, esp. employees, who carry out the work of an 
establishment or perform a specific function. 
Id. R 1074 (emphasis added) (Addendum Ex. H). As noted in the Webster's College 
Dictionary, the "most common senses [of the term defined are] listed first." Great 
American ignores both the dictionary and the thesaurus by arguing that such definitions 
(continued...) 
37 
B. SOSfs Alleged Subjective Intent is Inconsistent With Actual Conduct 
and Such Intent is Legally Irrelevant. 
Pushed to justify its bizarre interpretation of "temporary" and "staff," Great 
American ascended to 30,000 feet and argued to the trial court that "[t]his case is about 
whether SOS intended that its employees driving customers1 vehicles . . . be insureds." 
See R 1710 (emphasis added). 
Unfortunately, Great American's tactic worked and the trial court disregarded its 
role to interpret policy language according to objective evidence. See 17A Am.Jur.2d 
Contracts §§ 347-48 (quoted supra Section III.A). Instead, the trial court gave complete 
deference to SOS's post-claim assertion of subjective "intent." See R 1834. In doing so, 
the trial court set up the strawman that SOS did not intend for all its workers to be 
covered because such a position is "untenable." R 1834. However, the trial court's all or 
nothing approach is legally and factually irrelevant. The issue is not whether SOS 
intended for all its employees supervised by clients to be "insureds" (a position never 
advocated by Peters), but rather what subset of employees supervised by clients are 
excluded as "temporary" employees. 
12(...continued) 
"are problematic" because "the first dictionary definition of'staff is typically 'rod' or 
'stick' [and] [b]y this measure no one would be 'staff.'" See R 973 at 5 n.6. In Webster's 
College Dictionary, "stick" is the fourth definition and the fact that the word "staff has a 
different meaning when the reference is to an inanimate object does not mean that the 
word "staff cannot be given its "most common sense[]" meaning when the reference is to 
a person, i.e. "employees, who carry out the work." 
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Indeed, it is undisputed that SOS intended for some employees supervised by 
clients (the non-"temporary" employees) to be "insureds" since it represented and 
warranted such coverage to clients. The facts (detailed below) prove SOS confirmed 
automobile coverage for its full-time employees leased to customers. Even more 
importantly, SOSfs alleged subjective "intent" is irrelevant. These two points are 
addressed below. 
L SOS's Post-Claim Position of "Intent" is Contrary to its Conduct 
SOS clients oftentimes contractually demanded affirmation of automobile 
insurance for the client and for the SOS employees doing work. SOF Tflf 28-34. To meet 
these requirements, SOS was required to either obtain an endorsement modifying the 
Federal Policy or locate existing language in the policy that provides such coverage. SOF 
T| 30. Federal, however, issued no such endorsements and SOS knew Federal would 
never do so. SOF f 31. SOS nevertheless issued "Certificate(s) of Liability Insurance" 
through its agent representing to SOSfs clients that those clients have "additional insured" 
status for automobile liability coverage including excess liability coverage under the 
Great American Policy. SOF ^ 32 (Addendum Ex. F). 
Because these certificates do not modify the policies, the only basis for confirming 
"additional insured" status to clients is the language of the Federal Policy. In making 
these representations, SOS obtained Federal's written opinion that there is a subset of 
employees sent to work under the supervision of the clients who are covered "insureds" 
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under the Federal Policy and, consequently, SOS clients are also covered "insureds" to the 
extent of vicarious liability. SOF f 33 (Addendum Ex. G). This interpretation applies 
equally to Peters since it is based upon the language of the Federal Policy, not an 
endorsement addressed to a particular client.13 
SOS relied on and took advantage of Federal's interpretation in order to satisfy 
client's contractual demands, SOF fflf 28-34, and SOSfs post-claim statements of intent are 
inconsistent with its prior conduct.14 SOS is admittedly motivated post-claim by an 
interest in avoiding increased premiums. Id. at ^ 27. In reality, the record reveals that 
SOS paid for non-owned automobile coverage for an estimated 10,000 employees, 
including payrollers. See SOF ffl[ 35-36; see also R 1414 (fflf 28-30); R 647; R 1492; 
R 1700-06; and R 1501. While SOS hoped that clients would carry their own insurance 
and that such insurance would first respond to claims, SOS was required by contract to 
have additional automobile insurance. Id. Great American's after-the-fact "parade of 
13The trial court clearly did not understand and/or did not consider the undisputed 
facts on this point. See R 1855 at 25, 49-57. 
14The trial court's statement that it is factually undisputed "that Peters was not part 
of the SOS staff is flatly wrong because the issue of what "staff means is a legal issue 
not an issue of unilateral intent and undisputed admissible evidence uniformly refutes 
this conclusion. SOS's factual claim is that no employee supervised by a client was part 
of its "staff." However, the actual evidence is that SOS represented and warranted 
insurance coverage for employees supervised by clients when coverage was available 
only for SOS's "staff." See SOF fflf 6, 28-34. Second, SOS publicly markets these same 
employees supervised by clients as staff who provide "staffing solutions." See supra note 
11. The most that can be said is that SOS argues it internally refers to employees 
supervised by others as non-staff, but SOS's internal conduct is irrelevant {infra Section 
II.B.2), and the objective evidence is uniformly contrary to the trial court's conclusion. 
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horribles'1 that SOS would never pursue insurance even on a secondary basis is simply 
refuted by undeniable evidence. SOF at ffif 28-34. 
Because the facts related to SOS's conduct are undisputed and support a finding of 
coverage, Great American had to convince the trial court to somehow ignore these facts. 
Remarkably, Great American convinced the trial court to accept a mere apology. Great 
American explained SOS's conduct by saying that SOS "like all businesses . . . were 
under pressure to do certain things. Nobody wanted to issue these certificates [showing 
insured status for customers and the involved employees]." R 1855 at 24; see also 
R 1729-30 ("business pressures forced" SOS to confirm automobile insurance coverage 
for employees). Great American's apology, however, does not pass legal scrutiny. It is 
black letter law that actions speak louder than words and SOS's conduct conclusively 
rebuts Great American's position of a contrary intent that was never communicated as 
described below. See A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.16 (2003); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) CONTRACTS § 204(4), cmt. g ("The parties to an agreement know best what 
they meant, and their action under it is often the strongest evidence of their meaning."). 
2. SOS's Unique Understanding of the Words "Staff and "Temporary" 
Was Never Communicated to or Agreed to by Federal 
Even if SOS's conduct were consistent with its post-claim assertions of "intent," 
the law is clear that subjective intent is irrelevant. SOS's witnesses themselves concede 
that SOS's internal use of "temporary" to describe a full-time permanently leased 
employee is contrary to the ordinary dictionary meaning of the word. SOF f 22; see also 
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SOF Tflf 20-21. More importantly, SOS representatives admit never communicating SOSfs 
"unique" understanding of the words "temporary" or "staff to Federal. SOF % 23 (neither 
the risk manager nor in-house counsel communicated with Federal). SOS's insurance 
agent is the only individual to interact with Federal on SOS's behalf. He does not recall 
explaining SOS's unique use of "staff or "temporary" to Federal and there is no evidence 
that Federal agreed with or knew of SOS's alleged special use of these words. Id. Indeed, 
the agent could not have explained SOS's alleged intent if he had been asked because 
he does not know whether a payroller such as Peters was intended by SOS to be 
considered part of the "staff or a "temporary." Id.15 
Consequently, SOS's alleged internal use of words is irrelevant. Evidence of an 
alleged subjective and unilateral intent of one party has no bearing on interpretation. 17A 
Am.Jur.2d Contracts §§ 347-48.16 Even if SOS's internal use of words were considered 
15Great American's counsel elicited the following testimony: 
Q: (BY MR. LUND) Are you familiar enough with what SOS sought to 
accomplish with its coverage to tell whether or not they sought to 
have coverage limited to staff that would or would not include 
paiyrollers. 
THE WITNESS: I would not know how to answer that question. 
R1453. 
]6See also Greer v. Northwestern Nat'llns. Co., 743 P.2d 1244, 1249 (Wash. 1987) 
(parties had contrary understandings and so extrinsic evidence including what the broker 
told the policyholder is irrelevant); Over the Road Drivers, Inc. v. Transport Ins. Co., 637 
(continued...) 
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"reasonable," this Court has squarely held that a policyholders "reasonable expectation" 
that a policy will be read in a certain way is irrelevant to the way it is construed. See 
Allen v. Prudential Prop, and Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 807 (Utah 1992). 
In short, there is no evidence of an agreement between SOS and Federal to read the 
words "staff1 or "temporary" in a special way. Consequently, SOS's post-claim proffers 
of alleged intent are a red-herring. 
C. The Actions of Federal SOS and Great American Demonstrate 
Coverage. 
While Peters believes this Court can simply read endorsement 16-02-33 and find 
coverage, it is clear that if this Court considers evidence beyond the contract, the 
admissible evidence is not SOSfs secret undisclosed intent (contrary to its actions), but 
rather performance evidence from SOS (described above), Federal and even Great 
American. 
Specifically, Great American is faced with the reality that Federal, the party that 
wrote endorsement 16-02-33 (SOF f 25), performed by paying the entire $1,000,000 
(...continued) 
F.2d 816, 819 (1st Cir. 1980) (statements by an underwriter concerning meaning of a 
policy are irrelevant because "they prove nothing; it is the parties mutual understanding of 
what the contract meant that is important here."); State Auto Ins. Ass'n. v. Anderson, 528 
A.2d 1374, 1376 (Pa. Ct. App. 1987) (even if intent is established "our law has never 
indicated that one party's subjective intent or understanding of a contractual obligation 
controls that obligation."); Klos v. Lotnicze, 133 F.3d 164, 168 (2nd Cir. 1997) (objective 
not subjective intent controls); Swaminathan v. Swiss Air Transport Co., Ltd., 962 F.2d 
387, 389 (5th Cir. 1992) (same). 
43 
claim under language Great American now argues eliminates coverage. Recognizing the 
significant of this fact, Great American went on the offensive below, first arguing that 
Federal's payment was a "mistake," a "staged event" and a "confected . . . settlement." 
See R 979-80. Nothing could be further from the truth as Great American knows. The 
trial judge dismissed Great American's arguments as "all speculation." See R 1855 at 21. 
In reality, the record shows that Great American tried to convince Federal to change its 
finding of coverage for more than a year prior to Federal's payment. See SOF126; see 
i 
also R 814-18 (|f 19-28). Federal's finding of coverage was made long before any 
settlement was reached and before the finding of coverage was even communicated to 
counsel for Peters and the Knutesons. R 816. Great American's efforts to portray these 
facts as staged by lawyers (who were not yet retained) smacks of desperation. Great 
American also tries to dismiss Federal's payment of the claim by arguing that only 
evidence of events at the time of contracting are relevant. However, this Court has 
clearly held that performance evidence is persuasive regarding intent. See Peterson v. 
The Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, % 23,48 P.3d 918 (contract will be read consistently 
with "actions of the parties in proceeding under the contract."). 
Great American is equally defensive in responding to other performance evidence, 
including statements by Great America's own expert coverage counsel, Tim Dunn, and by 
its adjuster, Guy Blaire, both of whom read the Federal Policy consistently with Peters' 
interpretation for substantial periods of time. Great American argues that the written 
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statements of these individuals are not "admissions." Great American goes so far as to 
argue that Mr. Dunn, who wrote at least three coverage letters (R 635-41, 754-54) over 
three months, may not have read the entire Federal Policy. See R 983-87. These 
arguments are nonsense. Courts frequently bind insurance companies to the admissions 
of their counsel or the insurance company's agent adjustors.17 
In short, the reading of endorsement 16-02-33 offered by Peters is correct and 
consistent with the only potentially relevant evidence of "intent." Peters is not an 
excluded "temporary" and therefore this Court must order that he is a covered "insured." 
IV. AMBIGUITY IN ENDORSEMENT 16-02-33 MANDATES A FINDING OF 
COVERAGE. 
Alternatively, even if this Court finds that Great American has advanced a 
"reasonable" interpretation of 16-02-33, the interpretation offered by Federal and Peters is 
17See e.g. State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 847 (Utah 1988) ("The general rule is 
that statements made by an attorney concerning any matter within the scope of his 
authority are admissible [and the attorney's authority is] measure[d] . . . by the same tests 
of express or implied authority as would be applied to other agents"); Rice v. Granite Sch. 
Dist, 456 P.2d 159, 163 (Utah 1969) (adjustorfs statements that "insurance company 
admitted liability" would prevent carrier from relying on limitations period if proven to be 
true); Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 799 n.l (Utah 1998) (an insurance "adjuster . . . 
is an employee of [the carrier] which has the express, contractual obligation to settle and 
otherwise adjust a claim" and therefore the adjustor has the authority to agree to 
arbitration.); see also State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Potter, 186 F.2d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 
1950) (statements by adjustor and insurance company's counsel are admissible against 
insurance company); Schmidt v. Luchterhand, 214 N.W.2d 393, 400 (Wis. 1974) 
(counsel's admission of coverage is binding); Bordelon v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 124 
So.2d 634, 637 (La. Ct. App. 1960) (same). 
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also reasonable. Consequently, on this ground alone the trial couifs ruling must be 
reversed. 
Great American's argument boils down to a claim that Federal's interpretation of its 
own policy is unreasonable as a matter of law even though Federal drafted endorsement 
16-02-33 and it was confident enough in its interpretation to pay $1,000,000. Great 
American is forced to take this awkward position because it is settled that "any ambiguity 
or uncertainty in the language of an insurance policy must be resolved in favor of 
coverage." LDSHosp., 765 P.2d at 858; Versaw, 2004 UT 73 at ^ 25; see also Dennis, 
645 P.2d at 675 (if due to use of an ambiguous term, "the company [defined the insureds] 
more extensively] than it contemplated, the fault lies in its own selection of the words . . 
. it chose."). 
Federal's interpretation is reasonable for all the reasons described above. Federal's 
interpretation is consistent with SOS's statements to clients confirming automobile 
coverage for clients and for the full-time employees assigned to clients. See supra 
Section III.B.l. Federal's interpretation is also consistent with the interpretation of Great 
American's original coverage counsel and adjustor. See supra Section III.C. 
Great American also recognized in litigation that the Federal Policy is subject to 
more than one interpretation. Specifically, Great American was asked a straightforward 
question: "[a]dmit that Dallas W. Peters falls within the definition of'Employee' as 
defined in Section V. DEFINITIONS 1f E of the Federal Policy." See Great American 
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Admissions, Request No. 6 (R 630). Great American's reply implicitly (if not explicitly) 
concedes ambiguity: 
The Request as written asks for an admission regarding the 
employment status of Dallas W. Peters, but does not specify by 
whom or what entity Dallas W. Peters was employed. Great 
American is therefore unable to admit or deny this Request 
without the necessary clarification as to the employer. 
Id. (emphasis added). If Great American cannot answer this most basic of questions, it is 
clear a lay person could not conclude with certainty that Peters is an uncovered 
"temporary employee." 
Most importantly, the reading offered by Federal and by Peters is reasonable based 
upon the words used. As detailed above (see supra Section III.A), Great American is 
attempting to turn the word "temporary" into its antonym, "permanent." Great American 
does this even though defined terms in the Federal Policy make it clear that "temporary" 
means short term and that the expected duration of employment is an important coverage 
distinction. Id. Also, the word "staff is flexible and uncertain, and it can refer to an 
organization's employees. At a minimum, "staff does not have the precise meaning 
Great American attributes of not working "under the supervision of clients" no matter 
whether such arrangement is "temporary" or "permanent." 
Because the reading offered by Federal and Peters is reasonable, coverage must be 
provided based upon an ambiguity. See Versaw, 2004 UT 73 at \ 25. Federal concedes 
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ambiguity. SOF ^ 26. On this independent basis alone, the trial court's granting of 
summary judgment must be reversed.18 
V. GREAT AMERICAN IS BOUND BY FEDERAL'S PROVISION OF 
COVERAGE. 
Great American argues its coverage is "no broader . . . than is provided under 
such underlying poIic[y],ff (R 704) (emphasis added). Federal has undeniably provided 
coverage (SOF at | | 14-15). Consequently, Great American must follow suit under the 
terms of its policy and the arguments it presents. 
Courts frequently state that a primary carrier's reading of its policy, as the drafter 
and party with whom the policyholder interacts, must take precedent over an excess 
carrier's uninvolved second guessing. Where the primary carrier has a different intent 
from that of the following form carrier, courts consistently read the primary and following 
form policies in harmony to find coverage. See Playtex FP, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 
609 A.2d 1087, 1093 (Del. 1991) ("excess insurers who follow form are generally held to 
18Knutesons have offered another alternative basis to find coverage under the 
Federal Policy. Under Section II-Liability Coverage, f^ A.l.a, the Federal Policy states 
that f,[t]he following are'insureds:' You for any covered'auto.'" See R 655. Great 
American first argued that this language applies only to corporate entities (see R 20), but 
later conceded this language may also be read to apply to individuals, including an "SOS 
Staffing staff member" but not Peters. R 22 (n.3). In Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty Mut. Fire 
Ins. Co., 710 N.E.2d 1116, 1119 (Ohio 1999) the Ohio Supreme Court held that the word 
"You" in an automobile liability policy issued to a corporation is ambiguous and subject 
to more than one reasonable interpretation in determining whether "you" refers to the 
individuals who act on behalf of the corporation. The Court reached this conclusion 
although the policy stated (as does the Federal Policy) that "throughout this policy the 
words you and your refer to the named insured shown in the declarations." Id. at 1118. 
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the intent of the primary insurer."); Associated Indent. Corp. v. Dow Chemical Co., 814 F. 
Supp. 613, 618, n.5 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (language in primary and excess policies should be 
read consistently "if possible" because otherwise the expectation of a meaningful and 
coordinated insurance program is frustrated). 
Similarly, in AmwayDist. Benefits Assoc, v. Northfieldlns. Co., 323 F.3d 386 (6th 
Cir. 2003) a primary insurer failed to notify the policyholder at renewal of an 
endorsement that cut back the scope of coverage. The following form carrier relied upon 
the endorsement to deny the claim. The Court held that "because of the 'follow form1 
linkage between an excess insurer and the primary insurer" the excess carrier is bound by 
the primary carriers "procedural as well as substantive obligations to their common 
insured." Id. at 393. The excess carriers' remedy if the primary carrier makes a mistake is 
through "an indemnity action against the primary." Id. Other courts have likewise held 
that a follow form excess carrier is obligated to provide coverage even in situations where 
the primary policy is reformed post-claim. See R. W. Beck & Assoc, v. City of Sitka, 27 
F.3d 1475, 1483 (9th Cir. 1994); Great Atl. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 713 F.2d 
976, 980 (8th Cir. 1985); I.E. Meyers Co. v. Harbour Ins. Co., 394 N.E.2d 1200, 1202-03 
(111. 1979). 
This case presents an even more compelling set of facts to read the policies in 
harmony because there is no need to reform the Federal Policy. Great American has 
expressly agreed to provide excess insurance for coverage "provided under such 
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underlying [Federal] polic[y]." See R 704. Since Federal has provided coverage of 
$1,000,000, the Great American Policy is therefore triggered under the language of the 
Great American Policy. SOF at ^[ 14-15. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's grant of summary judgment must be reversed. This Court must 
rule that Peters is an "insured" under the Great American Policy for one of the four 
independent reasons described above. Alternatively, this Court should find that there are 
unresolved questions of fact surrounding "intent" based upon, among other things, SOS's 
conduct inconsistent with its claimed subjective intent. 
fn±k 
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